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LEGISLATION 
THE MARYLAND EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENT: EIGHT YEARS 
OF APPLICATION 
"As the species homo sapiens slowly evolved from the 
baser life forms, both a congregating into a family group and 
a division of labor therein became saliently characteristic. 
Man was the hunter and the warrior; Woman, the keeper of 
the hearth and rocker of the cradle. Even latter-day refine-
ments were little more than variations upon this primordial 
theme. An increasingly organized society fashioned customs 
and then conventions and then laws to enforce the obligations 
implicit in this division. In the post-World War II enlighten-
ment, however, such notions appear as remote as the Pleis-
tocene. Organized society may still make distinctions based 
upon physical prowess, intellectual endowment, earning 
capacity, etc., but it may no longer arbitrarily assign roles 
and obligations automatically upon the basis of gender. 
"This enlightenment found expression in our own 
sovereignty on November 7, 1972, with the ratification of 
Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights: 'Equality of 
rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because 
of sex.' "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judge Charles E. Moylan's characterization above of the social 
history leading to the ratification of the Maryland equal rights 
amendment2 provides a backdrop for viewing the subsequent social 
development of sexual equality, but it is not an entirely accurate 
assessment of the role played by the Maryland ERA since its 
ratification. Rather than the natural extension of a developing policy 
of equal rights for women, the ratification of an equal rights 
amendment in Maryland represents a radical departure from prior 
laws concerning women. None of the change that Judge Moylan 
attributes to the post-war period took full effect in any jurisdiction 
until that change was mandated by constitutional provision. 
This article undertakes a general review of equal rights for 
women from three perspectives. First, a legal history of women's 
1. Coleman v. State, 37 Md. App. 322, 323, 377 A.2d 553, 554 (1977). 
2. Mn. CONST., D~:cI.. OF RIGHTS art. 46. This provision will be referred to as the 
Maryland equal rights amendment or "ERA." Although not all state constitu-
tional guarantees of equal rights for women are constitutional amendments, for 
the sake of convenience they will be designated as "equal rights amendment" or 
"ERA." 
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rights in this country indicating why individual states mandated 
equal rights in their own state constitutions.3 Second, an examina-
tion of the interpretation of equal rights amendments by the courts 
in other states providing a comparative look at the Maryland ERA in. 
application.4 Finally, a consideration of the Maryland courts' inter-
pretation of the ERA, and the General Assembly's reaction to that 
interpretation, suggesting answers to questions as yet unsolved that 
will demonstrate the effect of the ERA in Maryland.s 
II. WOMEN'S RIGHTS - AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. A 450-year Tradition 
During America's colonial period, both men and women were 
participants in an agricultural economy, and both were equals. 
Nonetheless, married women possessed neither political power nor 
legal identity.6 Then, in 1776, Thomas Jefferson authored the 
Declaration of Independence proclaiming that all men are created 
equal. Despite the sweeping eloquence of that idea, women gained no 
rights under Jefferson's scheme. Jefferson wrote that women had to 
be excluded from politics "to prevent depravation of morals and 
ambiguities of issues.'" 
American women generally accepted their lack of legal standing 
with resigned frustration until, on July 19, 1848, a group of women 
became angry enough to call for a women's rights convention at 
Seneca Falls, New York. That first women's rights convention, led by 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton,S composed a Declaration of Rights express-
ing the participants' frustration with the roles into which American 
women were then forced. The women's Declaration, paralleling the 
language of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, declared the 
signers' strong belief that both men and women were created equal 
and demanded that law and social policy reflect that view.9 Little 
change in either law or social policy, however, resulted from the 
Seneca Falls convention. 
3. See text accompanying notes 6-33 infra. 
4. See text accompanying notes 34-58a infra. 
5. See text accompanying notes 59-158 infra. 
6. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442, which reads, in part: "By marriage, 
the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage. . . ." 
During the colonial period, single women had some political rights. The 
right to vote was based on ownership of property, and unmarried women were 
allowed to hold legal title to property. DePauw, Women and the Law: The 
Colonial Period, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS 107, 111 <1977l. 
7. Thomas Jefferson, quoted in Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 
TULANE L. REV. 451 (978), 
8. See generally L. BANNER, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON (1979l. 
9. See Kerber, From the Declaration of Independence to the Declaration of 
Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early Republic 1776·1848. 6 
HUMAN RIGHTS 115, 118-21 <1977l. 
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Following the Civil War, the fourteenth amendmentlO was 
proposed and ratified as an express guarantee of equal rights for the 
newly emancipated slaves, but many mid-nineteenth century femin-
ists viewed the new amendment as an opportunity to improve the 
status of women. The first signal of what women could expect from 
Supreme Court interpretation of the fourteenth amendment came in 
the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873. 11 The Court, discussing the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, expressed the 
opinion that it was doubtful "whether any action of a State not 
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or 
on account of their race, will ever come within the purview of this 
provision. "12 
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court also ruled 
that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was merely a confirmation of the existing law and that no new 
rights were extended by its ratification. The Court subsequently 
relied on this interpretation in Bradwell v. Illinois/3 the first case 
directly testing the application of the fourteenth amendment to 
women generally. Myra Bradwell had been denied admission to the 
Illinois bar solely because she was a woman. Bradwell, claiming that 
admission to the practice of law was a privilege of citizenship 
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, sued for admission. 
Relying on the recent Slaughter-House Cases ruling, the Bradwell 
Court approved the Illinois statutory scheme prohibiting the admis-
sion of women to the bar and held that the practice of law was not a 
"privilege" of citizenship.14 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
11. Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-
House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
12. [d. at 81. 
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
14. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Bradwell for feminists of the time was 
the language of Justice Bradley in his concurring opinion: 
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the 
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as 
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which 
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. . . . 
. . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the 
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the 
Creator. 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141. See Hochfelder, Equal Rights - Where Are We Now?, 
64 ILL. B.J. 558, 559 (1976). 
In Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874), Virginia Minor, 
pinning her hopes on the privileges and immunities clause, pressed a claim that 
she was entitled to the right to vote. In an opinion equating women with 
children for the purpose of determining legal rights, the Supreme Court 
rejected any chance of granting women the right to vote. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 
174. 
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Thus, the case for equal rights for women had failed under both 
the equal protection and the privileges and immunities clauses of the 
fourteenth amendment. Not until 1908 did the Supreme Court 
address whether the due process clause allowed discrimination based 
upon sex.IS In Muller v. Oregon,I6 the defendant laundry owner was 
convicted of violating an Oregon statute limiting the number of 
working hours for women employees. Muller, relying on a 1905 
Supreme Court decision invalidating on fourteenth amendment due 
process grounds a New York statute limiting working hours for male 
bakers,17 asserted that the same rule forbidding discrimination 
against male bakers applied to regulations governing working hours 
for women. The Supreme Court, manifesting a paternalistic need to 
protect women from themselves, ruled that the Oregon statute was 
valid under the due process clause. 18 
In the 1961 case of Hoyt v. Florida,19 the Supreme Court 
reiterated its unwillingness to recognize equal rights of women 
under the fourteenth amendment. Hoyt was convicted by an all male 
jury of killing her husband. She argued on appeal that the absence of 
women from the jury substantially diluted any chance of prevailing 
on the defense that her actions were justified by her husband's abuse. 
In an unanimous opinion, the Court ruled that the Florida statute 
limiting jury service to those women who volunteered violated 
neither the equal protection clause nor the due process clause.2o 
Thus, the Court seemed firmly entrenched in its position that the 
fourteenth amendment did not afford significant rights to women. 
B. The Modern-day Ebb and Flow 
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent reluctance to utilize the 
fourteenth amendment as a framework for women's rights, in 1971 
the Court's resolve to deny women any protection under that 
15. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
16. [d. 
17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.s. 45 (1905). 
18. In speaking of women, the Muller Court said: 
It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her 
brother and depends upon him. Even though all restrictions on political, 
personal and contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far 
as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it 
would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and 
look to him for protection . . . . 
208 U.S. at 422. Forty years later, the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan 
statute which purported to protect women by prohibiting them from tending 
bar unless their husbands or fathers owned the business. Goesaert v. Cleary, 
335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
19. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
20. The Hoyt Court harken~ back to its decision in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1879), and justified its decision to allow the exclusion of women from 
jury duty by reasserting that women were "still regarded as the center of home 
and family life." 368 U.S. at 61-62. 
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amendment ended. In Reed v. Reed,21 an Idaho statute granting 
males priority in the administration of decedent's estates was struck 
down as unconstitutional by an unanimous Court. The Reed decision 
marked a recognition by the Court of a revived feminist movement 
and an awareness that women were entitled to additional rights. 22 
The Court left unclear, however, the standard of protection that 
would apply to future sex discrimination cases. 
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Frontiero v. 
Richardson,23 the landmark case in women's rights under the United 
States Constitution. Frontiero, a married woman serving in the 
United States Air Force, was denied dependent benefits for her 
husband because she could not demonstrate that he was actually 
dependent upon her for more than half of his support. Married male 
Air Force servicemen were not required to make a similar showing 
in order to receive dependent benefits. In a plurality opinion, the 
Court ruled that the Air Force requirement was a violation of due 
process guaranteed under the fifth amendment.24 Justice Brennan, 
speaking for himself and three other Justices, 25 wrote in the opinion 
of the Frontiero Court that "sex, like classifications based upon race, 
alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must 
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. "26 These four Justices 
represented a reversal of the judicial philosophy from the decision 
twelve years earlier in Hoyt denying women protection under the 
fourteenth amendment. Thus, after Frontiero, women seemed on the 
brink of achieving constitutional protection ensuring equality of 
rights. 
21. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
22. See Ginsburg, From No Rights, To Half Rights, To Confusing Rights, 7 HUMAN 
RIGHTS 13 (1978). 
23. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
24. Id. at 91. 
25. Justices Douglas, White and Marshall concurred with Justice Brennan. Justice 
Stewart concurred in the judgment. Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun 
filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist dissented. 
In B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979), the authors assert 
that Justice Stewart came very close to joining Justice Brennan's opinion and 
declaring sex-based classifications suspect: 
Stewart indicated that he favored striking individual laws as they 
came up and, perhaps after a number of years, doing what Brennan 
proposed. It would be better for the dynamics of the law - a slow 
evolution and then a clearly logical ultimate step. Besides, Stewart was 
certain the Equal Rights Amendment would be ratified. That would 
relieve the Court of the burden. The responsibility really should be 
assumed by legislatures. 
Id. at 255 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan refused to compromise. 
26. 411 U.S. at 682 (footnote omitted). In his concurring opinion. Justice Powell 
maintained that it was not necessary to declare that sex based classifications 
were suspect to decide Frontiero. In fact, Justice Powell said, it was probably ill-
advised for the Court to do so in light of the pending ratification of the federal 
ERA. Id. at 691-92. 
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The plurality opinion in Frontiero, however, represented the 
apex of women's rights in the Supreme Court. In Kahn v. Shevin,27 
the Court withdrew the prospect that sex would be held to be a 
suspect classification protected by the requirement of strict scru-
tiny.2B Justice Douglas, writing for the majority of the Court, held 
that a Florida statute granting to widows tax incentives which were 
not available to widowers did not violate the requirements of due 
process because the statute rested "upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion."29 This language indicated that the proper standard of judicial 
review in gender-based classification cases was something less than 
the strict scrutiny requirement that the classification be justified by 
a compelling governmental interest. Thus, although the Kahn 
decision appeared to benefit individual women, it was actually a 
significant retreat from recognition of equal rights for all women. 
With the plurality opinion in Frontiero pointing the way toward 
sex as a suspect classification, and the majority opinion in Kahn 
indicating that a less rigid standard than strict scrutiny should be 
applied, the Court heard the case of Craig v. Boren,30 hoping to 
resolve the ambiguity. In Craig, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute that allowed women to 
drink alcohol at age eighteen, but required that men be twenty-one 
years old before they could drink. Rather than adopting the rationale 
of either Frontiero or Kahn, the Craig Court decided that gender-
based classifications could not be accommodated within the frame-
work of the traditional two-tier analysis and placed such classifica-
tions into a so-called middle-tier.31 The Court indicated that in order 
to "withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives."32 The new middle-
tier approach was a more fluid analysis that did not hold the Court to 
any established standard for judicial review. 
Under the Craig middle-tier standard of constitutional protec-
tion, women are in a hybrid position - they may be discriminated 
27. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
28. The source of the two-tier analysis approach was a footnote in United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
29. 416 U.S. at 355 (citations omitted). Justices Brennan and White filed dissents 
reaffirming their commitment to equal rights for women in line with the 
plurality opinion in Frontiero. 
Justice Douglas justified the apparent contradiction between his stands in 
Frontiero and Kahn by saying that there was a distinction between the two 
because the statute in Kahn was not designed purely for administrative 
convenience as was the one in Frontiero. Id. 
30. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
31. See Note, Equal Protection and the "Middle-Tier": The Impact on Womell alld 
Illegitimates, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303, 316-17 (1978>-
32. 429 U.S. at 197. 
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against in the absence of a compelling governmental interest, but 
something more than a rational basis is required to justify the 
constitutionality of that discrimination. The middle-tier test remains 
the currently applicable standard under the fourteenth amendment 
for review of gender-based classifications.33 
The view that society will no longer tolerate sex discrimination 
in any form is not borne out by recent Supreme Court decisions. At 
least at the national level, social evolution lIas not reached the point 
of prohibiting under all circumstances discrimination based upon 
gender. 
III. STATE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS 
- GENERAL OVERVIEW 
As a supplement to the limited protection afforded women under 
the fourteenth amendment, seventeen states have guaranteed equal 
rights for women in their constitutions.34 The effectiveness of these 
state equal rights amendments has been varied. With the court of 
each state free to set its own standard for fulfilling the purpose of its 
ERA, many interpretations have been proposed with varying effects 
upon equality of rights for women. State court interpretations of 
equal rights amendments may, however, be categorized roughly into 
three groupS.35 A consideration of those groups individually clarifies 
the status of equal rights law at the state level. 
A. The Rational Basis Group 
The easiest approach for state courts considering cases requiring 
interpretation of an ERA is to adopt a form of the traditional two-tier 
equal" protection ana~ysis. Three state courts interpreting state equal 
rights amendments have applied the rational basis tier of the equal 
protectiv~ test and require a mere showing that sex-based discrimi-
33. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 1540 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 
440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
34. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20, as 
amended by art. 5; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 21; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; LA. 
CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 1; 
MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18; PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 28; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. 4, § 1; VA. CONST. 
art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 3. 
A collection of the text of individual state equal rights amendments is 
contained in the appendix to Driscoll & Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look 
at State Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1282, 1309 (1978>. 
35. The three groups are: (1) states that have adopted a rational basis standard of 
analysis; (2) states that apply a strict scrutiny test; and (3) states that 
absolutely prohibit discrimination on account of sex. 
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nation is not arbitrary or capricious in order to allow the discrimina-
tion to stand.36 
Under the equal rights amendments of the three states in this 
group, Louisiana, Utah, and Virginia, women are afforded no 
practical protection when they encounter sex discrimination, as most 
of those states which have no formal ERA require at least the same 
rational basis to uphold sex-based discrimination.37 The constitution-
al protection of the women's rights in Louisiana, Utah, and Virginia 
would not be affected, therefore, if there were no state constitutional 
guarantees of equal rights for women. Significantly, these three 
states are among the fifteen that have failed to ratify the federal 
ERA.38 
Also, in light of the Supreme Court holding in Craig granting 
middle-tier protection in cases of sex discrimination,39 there is no 
reason for one who encounters discrimination on account of sex in 
these three states to rely upon the state ERA. The superior 
protection under the federal constitution has rendered the Louisiana, 
Utah, and Virginia equal rights amendments ineffective. 
B. The Strict Scrutiny Group 
Courts in several states have used equal rights amendments to 
grant women more constitutionally guaranteed rights than are 
available under the fourteenth amendment. Although the United 
States Supreme Court refused to grant "gender" suspect classifica-
tion status along with the accompanying right to strict scrutiny 
36. Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 1975); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 
994 <Utah 1975); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973). 
In Broussard and Cox, the doctrine of maternal preference in child custody 
cases was under attack. The Louisiana court in Broussard ruled that the 
maternal preference doctrine was proper because it was "not unreasonable, 
capricious or arbitrary." 320 So. 2d at 238. The court in Cox also upheld the 
doctrine, saying that Utah's ERA "does not mean that the law must pretend to 
be unaware of and blindly ignore obvious and essential biological differences." 
532 P.2d at 996. 
The Virginia court was required to decide in Archer whether a statute that 
allowed a woman to be excused from jury duty to fulfill her role as a mother 
was constitutional under the state ERA. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld 
the statute because "there [was al reasonable basis for the classification." 213 
Va. at 637, 194 S.E.2d at 710. The Archer court relied heavily upon prior 
Supreme Court decisions construing the fourteenth amendment and would 
probably apply the Craig middle-tier standard in interpreting the Virginia 
ERA today. 
The equal rights amendments of Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
and Wyoming have not been sufficiently litigated to determine the applicable 
standard in those states. See Comment, Equal Rights Provisions: The 
Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086, 1090 <1977>. 
37. See, e.g., Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62 (Me. 1970); Warshafsky v. Journal Co., 63 
Wis. 2d 130, 216 N.W.2d 197 (1974>-
38. U.S.C.A. CONST. amend. XXVII (proposed) (1974 & Supp. 1980) (annotation). 
39. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra. 
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protection,40 the states in this group require a compelling gov-
ernmental interest to justify sex-based discrimination.41 
The strict scrutiny approach is the most widely accepted test 
among states with equal rights amendments. States that apply this 
standard carry equal rights for women a step beyond the middle level 
protection of Craig.42 The Supreme Court has applied this same high 
level of protection in cases considering discrimination based upon 
race, alienage, and national origin, and the Court could be expected 
to apply the strict scrutiny standard to sex-based discrimination if 
the federal ERA is ultimately ratified. 
C. The Absolute Standard Group 
A progressive minority of states have not followed the general 
trend of adopting some form of the traditional equal protection 
analysis. In 1971, four distinguished constitutional scholars collabo-
rated on a law review article outlining how and why an absolute 
standard of review should be adopted if the proposed federal ERA is 
ratified.43 Largely as a result of that article, courts in Pennsylvania44 
40. See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra. 
41. E.g., Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 
703 (Colo. 1976); Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 170 Conn. 258, 365 A.2d 1118 
(1976); Holdman v. Olin, 59 Hawaii 346, 581 P.2d 1164 (1978); People v. Ellis, 
57 Ill. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974); Commonwealth v. King, __ Mass. __ , 
372 N.E.2d 196 (1977); Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1976). 
In Page, while the Supreme Court of Connecticut did not use the ERA to 
decide the case, it observed that if it had been called upon to determine what 
the proper stan"dard would have been, it would have ruled that "the strict 
scrutiny standard [was] mandated by the equal rights amendment." 170 Conn. 
at 267, 365 A.2d at 1124. 
The court in Ellis found that under the ERA "a classification based on sex 
is a 'suspect classification' which, to be held valid, must withstand 'strict 
judicial scrutiny.''' 57 Ill. 2d at 132-33,311 N.E.2d at 101. Similarly, in Mercer 
it was held that under the Texas ERA, "[a]ny classification based upon sex is a 
suspect classification." 538 S.W.2d at 206. 
In King, the court ruled that a statute which only allowed women to be 
charged with the crime of prostitution violated the ERA. The applicable 
standard, the court said, "must be at least as strict as the scrutiny required by 
the Fourteenth Amendment for racial classifications." __ Mass. at __ , 372 
N.E.2d at 206. 
In Holdman, the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that requiring women to 
wear a brassiere before allowing them to enter a state prison did not violate the 
ERA. "We have concluded that the treatment of which appellant complains 
withstands the test of strict scrutiny by reason of a compelling State interest." 
59 Hawaii at 354, 581 P.2d at 1169. 
42. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra. 
43. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women. 80 Y AI.~: L.J. 871 (1971). 
44. Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289.328 A.2d 851 (974), In striking down 
differential sentencing of men and women. the Pennsylvania court ruled that 
under the ERA "sex may no longer be accepted as an exclusive classifying tool." 
[d. at 296, 328 A.2d at 855. 
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and Washington45 have interpreted their states' equal rights amend-
ments to prohibit any sex-based discrimination.46 
States that have applied the absolute standard of review to their 
equal rights amendments have indicated their commitment to a clear 
break with sex stereotypes of the past. A major philosophical 
problem facing the "absolute standard" states is the uncertainty as to 
what degree, if any, social standards and essential physiological and 
biological differences may be considered in reviewing gender-based 
discrimination. The absolute standard of review permits no balanc-
ing whatever and is the strongest possible statement of a clear 
intention to make equal rights for women a reality. 
D. Maryland 
Once the ERA became a part of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced the problem of 
establishing the standard of review for sex discrimination cases. 
Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn47 gave the court 
an immediate opportunity to indicate its view of the impact of the 
new amendment. Although the court decided Kuhn without reference 
to the newly ratified ERA, it nonetheless expressed an opinion as to 
the proper standard of review were the ERA to have been applied to 
the case. The court of appeals indicated that, had it been called upon 
to apply the ERA, it would have adopted the strict scrutiny standard 
of review.48 This standard prevailed in Maryland for a period of four 
years.49 The court's 1977 decision in Rand v. Rand,50 however, a case 
actually requiring application of the amendment, adopted an unex-
pected approach. 51 
45. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). The Washington court 
did away with a rule which prohibited high school girls from competing on boys' 
teams, stating that the ERA was "intended to do more than repeat what was 
already contained in the otherwise governing constitutional provisions. . . by 
which discrimination based on sex was permissible under the rational 
relationship and strict scrutiny tests." Id. at 871, 540 P.2d at 889. 
46. See Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic 
Relations Law, 11 FAMILY L.Q. 101, 109 (1977); Comment, Equal Rights 
Provisions: The Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086, 
1108 (1977). 
Some commentators believe that the Colorado ERA has been interpreted to 
require an absolute standard of review in People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703 (Colo. 
1976). E.g., Annot., 90 AL.R.3d 158, 173 (1979). In Salinas, the Colorado court 
held a rape statute valid under the ERA even though it discriminated against 
men because the discrimination was "reasonably and genuinely based on . 
physical characteristics unique to just one sex." 551 P.2d at 706. This language 
indicates that the Colorado standard is more closely related to the strict 
scrutiny test. 
47. 270 Md. 496, 312 A2d 216 (1973). 
48. Id. at 506-07, 312 A2d at 222. 
49. See, e.g., Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 319 A2d 841 (1974), 
50. 280 Md. 508, 374 A2d 900 (1977). 
51. Id. 
352 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 9 
Florence and Robert Rand were divorced in 1971, and Robert was 
ordered to pay child support or $250 each month for the support of 
their minor daughter, Virginia. In 1975, Virginia was to begin 
college, and Florence filed suit seeking increased support from Robert 
to meet anticipated college expenses. Robert Rand's income was 
$27,000 per year, and Florence Rand's income was $16,000 per year. 
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled that Virginia would 
require $520 monthly while she was in college and that Robert would 
have to pay $480 monthly. The court of special appeals readjusted 
Robert's payments to reflect the proportion of his income to 
Florence's (63% or $325 monthly).52 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether the court of special 
appeals' ruling was proper under the ERA. 
The court of appeals considered each of the three possible 
approaches for setting a standard of review under the ERA. The 
court first examined and specifically rejected the view that any sex-
based classification that is reasonably related to a legitimate state 
interest may stand under the Maryland ERA.53 The court also 
unexpectedly rejected the view that the ERA permits sex-based 
classifications which arise from a compelling governmental in-
terest,54 the standard the court had suggested in Kuhn. Instead, the 
Court' of Appeals of Maryland specifically adopted the position of 
those state courts holding that equal rights amendments prohibit all 
classifications based on sex. 55 Drawing upon opinions rendered in 
Washington56 and Pennsylvania57 for guidance, the Rand court said, 
We believe that the broad, sweeping, mandatory language of 
the amendment is cogent evidence that the people of 
Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and 
women. The adoption of the ERA in this state was intended 
to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of the validity 
of sex-based classifications. 58 
52. Rand v. Rand, 33 Md. App. 527,365 A.2d 586 (1976). 
53. 280 Md, at 515, 374 A.2d at 904-05. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text 
supra. 
54. 280 Md. at 514-15, 374 A.2d at 904-05. See notes 40-42 and accompanying 
text supra. 
55. 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05. See notes 43-46 and accompanying 
text supra. 
56. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). See note 47 supra. 
57. Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289,328 A.2d 851 (1974). See note 46 supra. 
58. 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05. The court also said, "The words of the 
E.R.A. are. clear and unambiguous; they say without equivocation that 
'Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.' 
This language mandating equality of rights can only mean that sex is not a 
factor." [d. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03. 
At least one commentator has misinterpreted Rand, noting the case but 
concluding that the court announced no clear standard for reviewing cases 
under the ERA. Driscoll & Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly; A Look at State 
Equal Rights Amendments, 12 SUFFOLK D.L. REV. 1282, 1304 (1978). 
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With the decision in Rand, Maryland joined the small number of 
progressive states that consider absolute prohibition of sex based 
discrimination a workable standard of review for a state ERA. This 
new standard of protection was a radical break from the law in 
Maryland prior to the ERA.5sa 
IV. THE ERA IN MARYLAND 
The Maryland Equal Rights Amendment has had far-reaching 
effects on the law of Maryland. The major impact of the ERA has 
been in two areas, domestic relations law and criminal law. In the 
discussion that follows, the changes brought about by the ERA in 
those areas, as well as an analysis of whether the protections of the 
Maryland ERA extend beyond state action, will be considered. 
A. Domestic Relations Law 
In response to a number of social and .legal changes, including 
the adoption of the Maryland ERA, the courts and legislature in 
Maryland have made major revisions in the Maryland law of 
domestic relations. Of these changes in family law, the impact of the 
ERA has been the most signiticant with respect to alimony, child 
support, child custody, the presumption of a husband's dominance 
over his wife, and criminal conversation. 
1. Alimony 
Immediately following the adoption of the ERA in Maryland, 
divorced men attacked the statutory provision for alimony, asserting 
that it had become unconstitutional sex based discrimination. The 
pertinent sections of the Maryland Code then in effect provided that 
"[i]n cases where a divorce is decreed, alimony may be awarded,"59 
and that "[i]n all cases where alimony . . . [is] claimed, the court 
shall not award such alimony . . . unless it shall appear from the 
evidence that the wife's income is insufficient to care for her needs."60 
The first case challenging the constitutionality of the Maryland 
alimony statute on the basis of the newly ratified ERA was Minner v. 
58a. The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently reaffirmed its commitment to the 
absolute standard of review in Kline v. Ansell, No. 96, Sept. Term 1979 (Md., 
filed May 26, 1980). 
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (1973) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 
(Supp. 1979». 
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 5(a) (1973) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, 
§ 5(a) (Supp. 1979» (emphasis supplied). 
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Minner. 61 Mrs. Minner had been awarded alimony and attorney's fees 
after being granted a divorce a mensa et thoro. Mr. Minner's only 
argument on appeal was that Maryland alimony law violated the 
ERA because a husband could not receive alimony under the 
statute. 62 
The court of special appeals averted the inevitable collision 
between the ERA and Maryland's pre-ERA alimony policy by ruling 
that Mr. Minner had no standing to challenge the alimony statute 
under the ERA. At the divorce hearing in Minner, the chancellor had 
said: 
[W]e are not going to throw out the baby with the bath 
water and throw out the right of a wife to obtain alimony 
merely because the legislature has not given equal right to 
the husband. I am not called upon in this case to decide 
whether the husband in this State has a right to alimony 
63 
The court of special appeals agreed that Minner was not the proper 
case to consider the alimony issue. Even if husbands were entitled to 
collect alimony, Mr. Minner could not have qualified, and the court 
preferred to wait for a more suitable case.54 
Maryland's alimony statute, however, did not escape Minner 
unscathed. There were indications from the court of special appeals 
that the alimony law, as it stood, would have a troublesome future. 
In its opinion, the court quoted favorably from the chancellor's oral 
opinion: 
You question whether it is invidious discrimination 
because there is no concomitant right of the husband to ask 
for alimony from the wife if the facts in a particular case 
justified it. 
My answer to that. . is simply that you may have a 
point .... 65 
Meanwhile, an alimony provIsIon similar to that in effect in 
Maryland had been struck down on the basis of the Pennsylvania 
61. 19 Md. App. 154, 310 A.2d 208 (1973). 
62. Mr. Minner's attorney was unusually careful to preserve the trial record for an 
appeal based upon the ERA. It appears from the transcript of proceedings that 
Mr. Minner was anxious that his case test the effect of the ERA on Maryland's 
alimony statute. 19 Md. App. at 157, 310 A.2d at 210. 
63. 19 Md. App. at 157-58, 310 A.2d at 210. 
64. The issue of whether Maryland's alimony law was constitutional under the 
ERA was also considered in Colburn v. Colburn, 20 Md. App. 346, 316 A.2d 283 
(1974). The court of special appeals again ruled that the appellant lacked 
standing to bring the suit. [d. at 353-54, 316 A.2d at 287. 
65. 19 Md. App. at 157, 310 A.2d at 210. 
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ERA.66 Prior to any court action, however, the 1975 Maryland 
General Assembly reacted by changing the Maryland alimony 
statute to provide, "In cases where a divorce is decreed, alimony may 
be awarded to either spouse."67 Then in 1976, the legislature finished 
its alterations by amending another part of the alimony statute to 
provide, "In all cases where alimony . . . and counsel fees are 
claimed, the court may not award alimony. . . or counsel fees unless 
it appears from the evidence that the spouse's income is insufficient 
to care for his or her needs."68 The 1976 change was clearly a reaction 
to the changing climate surrounding the ERA and was enacted "[flor 
the purpose of extending the provisions for alimony . . . to both 
sexes; and generally clarifying the language of those provisions."69 
The hint from the court of special appeals had not been lost on 
the legislators. With the ratification of the ERA, dramatic changes in 
the area of alimony became necessary, and the legislature acted to 
eliminate sex as a factor to be considered in awarding alimony in 
Maryland. In 1979, the Supreme Court ruled that an alimony statute 
which would not allow men to collect alimony violated fourteenth 
amendment equal protection under the Craig middle-tier standard.70 
By amending the alimony statute, the Maryland General Assembly 
both anticipated and avoided state and federal constitutional prob-
lems. 
2. Child Support 
At common law, the primary responsibility for the support of 
minor children in Maryland was upon the father.71 Then, in 1929, the 
Maryland legislature enacted a statute that provided, "The father 
and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor child and 
are equally charged with its care, nurture, welfare and education. 
They shall have equal powers and duties, and neither parent has any 
right superior to the right of the other .... "72 But, courts in 
Maryland continued to apply the law on child support as they had 
66. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974). 
67. Law of April 22, 1975, ch. 332, 1975 Md. Laws 2119 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 16, § 3 (Supp. 1979» (emphasis added). 
68. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 440, 1976 Md. Laws 1161 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 16, § 5(a) (Supp. 1979» (emphasis added). 
69. [d. 
70. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
71. E.g., Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, 67 A. 132 (1907). The court ruled that it 
was "the duty of the father to provide reasonably for the maintenance of his 
minor children." [d. at 261, 67 A. at 136. 
72. Law of April 11, 1929, ch. 561,1929 Md. Laws 1362 (codified as amended at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978». See McKay v. Paulson, 211 Md. 90, 126 A.2d 
296 (1956), for a history of this section. 
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before the statute was passed.73 Largely ignoring the language in the 
1929 statute requiring that both parents be equally responsible for 
the support of their minor children, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland perpetuated the old rule that the father bore "a continuing 
common law obligation to support his children."74 
The common law rule as to child support remained in effect until 
the 1977 court of appeals decision in Rand v. Rand.75 In that case, 
the Rands had been divorced in 1971 and the husband had been 
ordered to pay child support for their minor daughter. Subsequently, 
the wife petitioned for an increase' in the child support payments, but 
the court of special appeals, while agreeing that an increase was in 
order, ruled that each parent was responsible for a proportion of the 
support equal to his or her ability to pay.76 
When the Rand case reached the court of appeals, the issue was 
whether the court of special appeals had acted properly in reinter-
preting Maryland's child support statute77 in light of the ERA.78 In 
deciding that the court of special appeals had acted properly, the 
court of appeals said: 
Applying the mandate of the E.R.A. to the case before 
us, we hold that the parental obligation for child support is 
not primarily an obligation of the father but is one shared by 
both parents. The clear import of the language of Art. 72A, 
§ 1, standing alone, seemingly compels that result. Any 
doubt remaining from the past failure of the courts to so 
interpret that statutory provision is removed by the gloss 
impressed upon it by the E.R.A. The common law rule is a 
vestige of the past; it cannot be reconciled with our 
commitment to equality of the sexes. Sex of the parent in 
matters of child support cannot be a factor in allocating this 
responsibility. Child support awards must be made on a 
sexless basis. 79 
73. E.g., Seltzer v. Seltzer, 251 Md. 44, 246 A.2d 264 (1968). 
74. [d. at 45, 246 A.2d at 265. See Wagshal v. Wagshal, 249 Md. 143,238 A.2d 903 
(1968); Woodall v. Woodall, 16 Md. App. 17,293 A.2d 839 (1972). 
75. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977). 
76. A discussion of Rand and the role it played in setting the standard of review for 
cases involving sex based discrimination under the Maryland ERA is contained 
in the text accompanying notes 47-58a supra. 
77. The support statute in effect in Maryland when Rand was decided was 
essentially the same as the 1929 statute. 
78. 280 Md. at 509, 374 A.2d at 901. 
79. [d. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905. The court also noted that Pennsylvania and 
Washington, both states which use an absolute standard of review, have 
reached the same result. [d. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905. See Conway v. Dana, 456 
Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); Smith v. Smith, 13 Wash. App. 381, 534 P.2d 
1033 (1975). 
The court of appeals remanded Rand for a determination by the chancellor 
of how much each party should pay. The court specifically refused to choose an 
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Thus, the interpretation of Maryland's child support statute was 
altered dramatically by the ERA. The rule of the common law had 
survived attempts by the legislature to change it, and the father 
remained responsible for the support of his children until the ERA 
took effect in Maryland. Rather than merely codifying the changing 
social status of women/o the ERA caused a radical break with prior 
child support law. The amendment effectively accomplished what the 
legislature had been unable to do by statute and placed women in the 
position of sharing responsibility for the support of their children. 
3. Child Custody 
Early common law presumed the father to know what was in the 
best interest of his minor child, and he invariably retained custody of 
the child upon dissolution of the marriage.8l Within the last 100 
years, however, this traditional approach changed; courts awarded 
traditional custody to the mother unless she was proven unfit.82 This 
latter rule was the law on child custody in Maryland when the ERA 
became a part of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in 1972.83 
exact formula, preferring that the chancellor make his determination in light of 
the totality of the circumstances of the parties. The court of special appeals had 
ruled that each spouse should pay a proportion of the child support equal to the 
proportion his salary bore to the salary of the other spouse. Under that test, 
Robert was liable for 5/8 of $520, or $325. [d. at 510, 374 A.2d at 905. The 
chancellor adopted that same test on remand and reached the same result. His 
actions were approved in a subsequent appeal. Rand v. Rand, 40 Md. App. 550, 
392 A.2d 1149 (1978). 
In German v. German, 37 Md. App. 120, 376 A.2d 115 (1977), a trial court 
had ruled that because a wife has an equal obligation to support her child 
under eighteen years of age, she must pay Y2 of the $500 child support. The 
court of special appeals said that Rand and the ERA require equality under the 
circumstances. Since the wife had a net income after expenses of $633 compared 
to the husband's $885, exactly Y2 was probably not equality under the 
circumstances. [d. at 122-23, 376 A.2d at 117. 
80. See text accompanying note 1 supra. 
81. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453, which reads, in part: "The legal 
power of a father, - for a mother, as such is entitled to no power, but only to 
reverence and respect; . . . ceases at the age of twenty-one." 
82. Francke, The Children of Divorce, NEWSWEEK, February 11, 1980, at 59. See, 
e.g., Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960). "Since the mother is the 
natural custodian of the young and immature, custody is ordinarily awarded to 
her .... " 221 Md. at 357, 157 A.2d at 446. 
83. See, e.g., Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190, 286 A.2d 535 (1972). 
Immediately following the ratification of the ERA in Maryland, one 
commentator predicted that under the ERA the presumption that an adulterous 
mother was an unfit guardian for her child would be held unconstitutional. 2 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 355 (1973), In fact, when the presumption was finally declared 
invalid in Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231 (1977), the ERA was not 
even mentioned. In ruling the adulterous mother presumption void, the court 
cited "rapid social and moral changes in our society" as a prime factor in its 
decision. [d. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235. 
For an article on child custody in Maryland, see Comment, Best Interests of 
the Child: Maryland Child Custody Disputes, 37 MD. L. REV. 641 (1978), 
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The child custody statute then in effect provided that each 
parent "shall have equal powers and duties, and neither parent has 
any right superior to the right of the other concerning the child's 
custody."84 Maryland courts ignored the plain meaning of the statute, 
however, and continued to prefer the mother in deciding custody 
cases.85 The courts used the maternal preference doctrine to grant the 
mother greater custody rights than the father when the child was of 
tender years.86 
The first post-ERA case to consider whether the maternal 
preference doctrine would survive the ratification of the ERA came 
in 1974. In Cooke v. Cooke,87 the trial court awarded the mother 
custody of a minor child relying, in part, upon Maryland's well-
established maternal preference doctrine. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland ruled that the evidence produced at trial was 
sufficient to support the decision to grant the mother custody 
independent of the maternal preference doctrine, but it raised sua 
sponte the issue of how the ERA affected the doctrine.88 The court 
concluded that the ERA severely curtailed the use of the maternal 
preference doctrine - the doctrine could be used as a tie-breaker in 
custody cases when all other factors were equal, but only as a 
tie-breaker.89 
Shortly after Cooke, the Maryland child custody statute was 
amended to provide that "in any custody proceeding, neither parent 
shall be given preference solely because of his or her sex."90 The 
effect of this amendment was tested in McAndrew v. McAndrew. 91 In 
McAndrew, the chancellor, who found that the mother and father 
would be equally fit guardians of their minor child, used the 
maternal preference doctrine as a tie-breaker in awarding custody to 
the mother. The court of special appeals avoided using the ERA to 
dispose of the maternal preference doctrine. Instead, the court cited 
the amendment to the statute as the determining factor in ruling 
that the maternal preference doctrine was no longer a valid 
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, * 1 (1973) (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 
72A, * 1 (1978)). 
85. See, e.g., Oberlander v. Oberlander, 256 Md. 672, 261 A.2d 727 (1970). 
86. See, e.g., Neuwiller v. Neuwiller, 257 Md. 285, 262 A.2d 736 (1970). 
87. 21 Md. App. 376, 319 A.2d 841 (1974). 
88. [d. at 379-80, 319 A.2d at 843. 
89. [d. 
90. Law of April 9, 1974, ch. 181, 1974 Md. Laws 806 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 72A, * 1 (1978», 
Cooke was decided on May 24, 1974, while the amendment, which was 
enacted for "the purpose of providing that neither spouse . . . be given 
preference because of sex in a court custody proceeding," took effect on JUly I, 
1974. [d. 
91. 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978). 
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consideration in granting child custody. Because the maternal 
preference doctrine was the only sex based classification under the 
child custody law, the court reasoned that the statute was meant to, 
and did, put the maternal preference doctrine to rest.92 
Some commentators have concluded that because the McAndrew 
opinion did not rely upon the ERA in doing away with the maternal 
preference doctrine,93 it was not actually an ERA case.94 There were 
indications in McAndrew, however, that the court of special appeals 
had changed its position since the decision in Cooke and would have 
been willing to declare the maternal preference doctrine constitu-
tionally lacking under the ERA. The court said, "To the extent that 
we postulated in Cooke that a preference of any type could be a 
tie-breaker, we disaffirm that theory. Our choice of that term in 
retrospect, like the use of the term maternal preference, was ill 
advised."95 Courts in Illinois and Pennsylvania had struck down 
maternal preference doctrines under their equal rights amendments 
between the time of the Cooke and McAndrew decisions.96 Also, 
during that same period, the court of appeals had indicated its 
intention to require an absolute standard of review in Maryland 
under the ERA.97 Despite the court's statement in McAndrew that it 
did not have to reach the issue of how the ERA affected the maternal 
preference doctrine, in fact, the ERA caused the demise of the 
doctrine so frequently applied before 1972. 
92. [d. at 8, 382 A2d at 1085. 
93. The court noted that the "[a]ppellant, below and on appeal, raised the issue of 
the effect of the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment on the maternal 
preference principle in custody cases. We do not reach the issue here .... " 39 
Md. App. at 8 n.9, 382 A.2d at 1086 n.9. 
94. Comment, Best Interests of the Child: Maryland Child Custody Disputes, 37 MD. 
L. REV. 641, 653-54 (1978); Annot., 90 AL.R.3d 158, 189-90 (1979). 
95. 39 Md. App. at 9, 382 A.2d at 1086 (emphasis added). 
96. Lane v. Lane, 40 Ill. App. 3d 229, 352 N.E.2d 19 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. 
Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A2d 635 (1977). 
Also between the decisions in Cooke and McAndrew, two federal courts 
passed up the opportunity to consider the validity of the maternal preference 
doctrine under Maryland's ERA. In Hinish v. Maryland, 393 F. Supp. 53 m. 
Md. 1975), affd, 558 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1977), the plaintiff alleged that the 
state trial court was wrong in awarding custody to the mother because she was 
a "more fit custodian for a child of tender years." [d. at 54. The United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland ruled that Hinish must exhaust his 
state remedies under the ERA before his case could be reviewed by a federal 
court. 
In Delavigne v. Delavigne, 530 F.2d 598, 600 (4th Cir. 1976), the father 
wanted to have his child custody suit heard in a federal court because, he 
alleged, the judges in Montgomery County were prejudiced against men. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal courts 
had no jurisdiction over the matter. Significantly, the district court had cited 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1, the Maryland ERA, and Cooke as evidence that 
the Maryland judicial system was not prejudiced against men. 402 F. Supp. 363, 
367-68 m. Md. 1975l. 
97. See text accompanying notes 47 -58a supra. 
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4. Husband's Dominance 
In Maryland, a presumption developed at common law that the 
husband was the dominant figure in a marriage. In Manos v. 
Papachrist,98 the court of appeals indicated that the presumption 
arose because "of the natural dominance of the husband over the 
wife, and the confidence and trust usually incident to their 
marriage."99 The first post-ERA case to consider the rule of the 
husband's dominance was Trupp v. WolffloO 
Trupp involved the multiple issues arising from the testamen-
tary disposition of a large number of shares of stock. One evidentiary 
issue concerned who bore the burden of showing whether there was a 
confidential relationship between a husband and wife. Wolff argued 
that the husband's dominance presumption raised an inference of a 
confidential relationship. Although the court found on other grounds 
that there was a confidential relationship, it went on to note, "the 
shaky foundation upon which the presumption rests in light of the 
Equal Rights Amendment."lol 
The court of special appeals once again had an opportunity to 
consider how the ERA affected the husband's dominance presump-
tion in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Craddock.102 In order to 
recover under Maryland's Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund 
law, a claimant is required to show that he is domiciled in Maryland. 
The domicile of a young married couple was at issue in Craddock. 
The court concerned itself only with the husband's domicile, saying 
that "[a)s the legal domicile of a wife is that of her husband, the 
question is where was [the husband) domiciled on the date of the 
accident."103 The court also was careful to note, however, "We do not 
reach the effect on this common law rule of the passage of the Equal 
Rights Amendment. . . ."104 
Finally, in Bell v. Bell/OS the court of special appeals ruled that 
the husband's dominance presumption had not survived the ratifica-
tion of the ERA in Maryland. In Bell, the wife's attorney prepared a 
separation agreement which she forwarded to her husband for his 
signature. The husband made substantive changes and called the 
wife to his office to sign the agreement. Although he did not verbally 
threaten his wife, the husband showed her cards which intimated 
that he knew she was having an affair (presumably using cards 
because he was taping the conversation). A tape of the conversation 
98. 199 Md. 257, 86 A.2d 474 (1952). 
99. [d. at 262, 86 A.2d at 476. 
100. 24 Md. App. 588, 335 A.2d 171 (1975l. 
101. [d. at 616 n.15, 335 A.2d at 188 n.15. 
102. 26 Md. App. 296, 338 A.2d 363 (1975l. 
103. [d. at 302, 338 A.2d at 367 (citation and footnote omitted). 
104. [d. at 302 n.2, 338 A.2d at 367 n.2. 
105. 38 Md. App. 10, 379 A.2d 419 (1977>. 
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allowed into evidence revealed that the wife had asked to leave or 
consult an attorney, but the husband threatened to sue for divorce on 
the ground of adultery if she did so. The wife signed the agreement, 
but subsequently sued to have the settlement set aside. Relying upon 
the presumption of a husband's dominance, she alleged that her 
husband had violated a confidential relationship. 
In striking down the presumption, the Bell court said, "We noted 
the questionable foundation upon which this presumption rests in 
light of ... the Equal Rights Amendment in Trupp v. Wolff Since 
that decision, the Court of Appeals has held that sex classifications 
are no longer permissible under the amendment. Consequently, the 
presumption of dominance cannot stand."lo6 Thus, the ERA elimin-
ated any possibility that either partner in a marriage could be 
considered dominant as a matter of law. 
5. Criminal Conversation 
The early English common law regarded the action of a man to 
entice another's wife into adultery as a significant civil wrong.107 
Thus, the cause of action for criminal conversation developed to 
provide compensation to the injured husband. Only men, however, 
could sue in tort for criminal conversation - an injured wife had no 
remedy in tort for her husband's adultery. lOB 
Although Maryland courts followed the common law approach at 
the time that the Maryland ERA was ratified,109 the trend current in 
1972 was toward granting a wife the right to sue for criminal 
conversation.l1O In 1976, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
adopted this view in Kromm v. Kromm, holding that Maryland law 
had progressed to the point that "the tort of criminal conversation 
may be maintained by the wife of the marriage."111 The Kromm court 
decided that under the Maryland Married Women's Property Act112 a 
wife had personal rights equal to those of her husband, including the 
right to sue for criminal conversation.1l3 Although the Kromm 
106. [d. at 13-14, 379 A.2d at 421 (citations omitted). See Eckstein v. Eckstein, 38 
Md. App. 506, 379 A.2d 757 (1978). 
In Eckstein, the court of special appeals reaffirmed its conclusion in Bell, 
but went even further and stated that the husband's dominance presumption 
was dead long before the decision in Rand. "Since the adoption of . . . the 
Equal Rights Amendment, we have abandoned the previous presumption that 
the husband was the dominant figure in a marriage." 38 Md. App. at 511, 379 
A.2d at 761. 
107. 3 W, BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139-40. 
108. [d.; see PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, ~ 124 (4th ed. 1971). 
109. See, e.g., DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 (1964). 
110. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Blackburn, 431 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1968). 
111. 31 Md. App. 635, 637, 358 A.2d 247, 249 (1976), 
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, ~ 5 <1971l. 
For an extensive discussion of the Married Woman's Property Act, see 8 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 584, 587 <1979l. 
113. 31 Md. App. at 637, 358 A.2d at 249. 
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decision was consistent with the ERA mandate that sex should no 
longer be a factor in determining rights and liabilities, the court did 
not mention the ERA. 
Beginning around 1975, a new trend toward abrogating the 
common law tort of criminal conversation emerged from the courts 
and legislatures in many jurisdictions. lI4 Despite this trend, in 1976 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled in Geelhoed v. Jensen that 
the cause of action for criminal conversation remained available in 
Maryland,lI5 and in 1977 the Maryland General Assembly rejected 
the opportunity to abolish the tort by statute.lI6 
Finally in 1980 the court of appeals reversed Geelhoed, declaring 
that the tort of criminal conversation no longer exists in Maryland. 
Judge Rita Davidson, writing for an unanimous court in Kline v. 
Ansell,l17 held that recovery for criminal conversation was barred by 
the Maryland ERA because only an injured husband could bring the 
cause of action. Without citing Kromm, the court effectively overruled 
the reasoning of the court of special appeals that the Married 
Women's Property Act extended recovery for criminal conversation 
to women. Rather than giving married women rights equal to those 
of their husbands, the court reasoned, the Act granted rights equal to 
those of unmarried women. liS "Thus, because at common law a 
woman did not have the right to maintain an action for criminal 
conversation, the married women's act did not extend that right to 
her."1l9 Nonetheless, the court believed that the Maryland ERA 
granted married women rights equal to those of their husbands. The 
Kline court cited the Maryland ERA as "a factor of sufficient 
significance to persuade [the court] that the action for criminal 
conversation is no longer viable."120 
In Kline, the court of appeals used the ERA to bring Maryland 
into line with the current trend toward abrogating the tort of 
criminal conversation. The court provided no explanation why 
extending a wife the right to sue for criminal conversation would not 
equally have satisfied the constitutional requirements of the ERA. 
114. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. * 52-572f (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
* 553.02 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. ClV. RIGHTS LAW * 80-A (McKinney 1976): 
Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 
272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976>. 
115. 277 Md. 220, 233, 352 A.2d 818, 826 (1976l. 
116. See Kl1ne v. Ansell, No. 96, Sept. Term 1979, slip op. at 7 (Md., May 26, 1980). 
In 1964, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that the cause of action for 
criminal conversation had survived the 1945 statutory abrogation of the tort of 
alienation of affection. DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 (1964l. 
117. No. 96, Sept. Term 1979 (Md., filed May 26, 1980l. 
118. [d. slip op. at 9 n.4. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. slip op. at 7. 
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Such an extension of the right to sue would have met the mandate of 
the ERA without clashing with the 1977 decision by the Maryland 
General Assembly not to abrogate statutorily the tort of criminal 
conversation. Instead, the court of appeals used the ERA as a means 
to avoid the doctrine of judicial restraint which would have required 
the court not to act where the legislature had refrained from 
acting.121 
It is clear after Kline that the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
views the ERA as an effective tool for bringing about social change 
that the court feels is important. The commitment to an absolute 
standard of review in Maryland remains strong following Rand and 
Kline and will likely continue to cause dramatic change in the area 
of domestic law. 
B. Criminal Law 
The far-reaching application of the ERA in the area of domestic 
relations demonstrates the commitment of judges and legislators in 
Maryland to reject antiquated laws which designate different social 
roles for the members of each sex. Likewise, changes in the area of 
criminal law reflect this commitment. 
1. Rape 
The Maryland rape statute in effect when the ERA was ratified 
provided merely that penetration without emission was evidence of 
rape, and that the penalty for rape was imprisonment for eighteen 
months to life. 122 Courts had to rely upon the common law definition 
of rape as "a man having unlawful'carnal knowledge of a female. . . 
by force without consent and against the will of the victim."I23 
Because women were physically unable -to meet this act requirement, 
they could never be perpetrators of the crime. 124 
In 1975, a convicted rapist brought an appeal challenging the 
constitutionality of the rape law under the Maryland ERA. In Brooks 
v. State,125 the defendant savagely raped a woman, brutally sodo-
mized her, beat her into unconsciousness, and then carved an X on 
her forehead. After being convicted by a jury, Brooks was sentenced 
to eighty years imprisonment. He raised a variety of claims on 
appeal. One of the issues Brooks argued was that Maryland's rape 
law, by definition applicable only to men, was unconstitutional. 
121. See Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 55, 405 A.2d 255, 256-57 (1979). 
122. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461 (1957). 
123. Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 468, 157 A.2d 922, 924 (1960). 
124. Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640, 313 A.2d 563 (974), 
125. 24 Md. App. 334, 330 A.2d 670 (1975). 
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The court of special appeals upheld Brooks' conviction against 
the ERA challenge, observing that the proposition that "only females 
may be raped is nothing short of a physiological reality."'26 In so 
deciding, however, the Brooks court employed the rational basis 
testl27 that had already been rejected by the court of appeals in favor 
of a standard at least equal to the strict scrutiny test. 128 In its 
eagerness to consider the ERA in conjunction with the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court of special 
appeals used the standard applicable to the fourteenth amendment to 
review the conviction under both constitutional provisions. 
The misapplication of the proper standard of review required by 
the ERA was noticed by the Maryland General Assembly. During the 
legislative session immediately following Brooks, the General 
Assembly repealed all sex-related criminal statutes in effect in 
Maryland and established a comprehensive sexual offense statutory 
scheme with new definitions and penalties. '29 The new law was 
sexually neutral - it contained no sex-based definitions or 
classifications. 
Even if the court had applied the proper strict scrutiny standard 
in Brooks, the rape statute in effect in 1975 may have been 
constitutional, though it applied only to men. In Illinois and Texas, 
states which have adopted the strict scrutiny test for ERA review, 
courts have upheld rape laws that were by definition applicable only 
to men. 130 In each case, however, the court used a test similar to the 
rational basis test. Whether such a statute could withstand review 
more stringent than the rational basis test is unclear. Under the 
Rand "absolute" standard, however, Maryland's rape law in effect in 
1975 probably would have been held unconstitutional. Once again 
the Maryland legislature acted to avoid the inevitable collision 
between an existing statute and the ERA. 
126. [d. at 338, 330 A.2d at 673. 
127. [d. at 338-39, 330 A.2d at 673. The court said that "the limitation of culpability 
[for rape] to males constitutes a rational classification directly related to the 
objective of the criminal penalty .... Surely, the state of facts in a rape 
situation, most sordidly demonstrated by the case at bar, rationally justify the 
sex classification at issue." [d. 
128. See Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 
216 (1973). See also text accompanying notes 47-49 supra. 
129. Law of May 17, 1976, ch. 573, 1976 Md. Laws 1528; Law of May 17, 1976, ch. 
574, 1976 Md. Laws 1541. The legislature completed the alterations during the 
next legislative session. See Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 290, 1977 Md. Laws 1976; 
Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 292, 1977 Md. Laws 1985; Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 
293, 1977 Md. Laws 1988; Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 294, 1977 Md. Laws 1990; 
Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 336, 1977 Md. Laws 2076 (all now codified at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 461-464E (Supp. 1979)). See also Note, Rape and Other 
Sexual Offense Law Reform in Maryland 1976-1977, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 151 
(1977). 
130. People v. Medrano, 24 Ill. App. 3d 429, 321 N.E.2d 97 (1974); Finley v. State, 
527 S.w.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 
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2. Criminal Non-Support 
At common law in Maryland, a husband owed a legal duty to his 
wife to provide for her supportl31 and to furnish her with necessar-
ies. '32 At the time of the ratification of the Maryland ERA, it was a 
criminal offense for a man to "willfully neglect to provide for the 
support and maintenance of his wife."'33 The constitutionality of this 
statute under the ERA was at issue in Coleman v. State. 134 
In Coleman, the appellant was convicted of both desertion and 
non-support of his wife under Maryland's criminal non-support 
statute and was sentenced to three years probation. On appeal, 
Coleman argued that Maryland's criminal non-support law was 
unconstitutional under the ERA because the statute contained no 
reciprocal requirement that a wife provide for the support of her 
husband. '35 The court of special appeals reversed Coleman's convic-
tion and ruled that, although the criminal non-support statute 
accurately reflected social temperament at the time it was enacted in 
1896, the law was an anachronism in 1977.136 Drawing upon the 
decision of the court of appeals in Rand, which had been handed 
down earlier that year, the court of special appeals said: 
Measured against the clear command of the Equal 
Rights Amendment, there is no question that [the criminal 
non-support statute] cannot pass muster. To establish that it 
is a crime for a husband to desert his wife but no crime for a 
wife to desert her husband and to establish that it is a crime 
for a husband to fail to support his wife but no crime for a 
wife to fail to support her husband is to establish a 
distinction solely upon the basis of sex. 137 
Some commentators viewed the Coleman decision as the demise 
of non-support as a crime in Maryland. '3B Shortly after Coleman, one 
student commentator pointed out that Coleman provided the Mary-
131. Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 A. 95 <1931l. 
132. Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955). 
133. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, ~ 88(a) (1971) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
* 88(a) (Supp. 1979». 
134. 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977). 
135. Id. at 324, 377 A.2d at 554. 
136. The court said that "the purpose that once animated * 88(a) is no longer the 
public policy of this state." 37 Md. App. at 328, 377 A.2d at 556. 
137. 37 Md. App. at 327,377 A.2d at 556. Coleman was the first major case to apply 
the strict prohibition standard of Rand, and Judge Moylan drew heavily upon 
the language in the Rand opinion in writing the opinion of the court in 
Coleman. 
138. Sykes, Of Men and Laws: Murphy, Cornford, Arnold, Potter, Parkinson, Peter, 
Maccoby, and Gall, 38 MD. L. REV. 37, 55 (1978); Comment, Decriminalization 
of Non-support in Maryland - A Re-examination of a Uniform Act Whose Time 
Has Arrived, 7 U. BALT. L. ~EV. 97 (1977). 
366 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 9 
land General Assembly with a perfect opportunity to decriminalize 
non-support entirely in Maryland139 and enact the Uniform Liability 
for Support Act. 140 Instead, the legislature acted to patch up the 
ailing criminal non-support statute by changing all sex-based 
references to sexually neutral terms. 141 The avowed purpose of the 
amendment was to extend "the criminal prohibition against willful 
nonsupport to all spouses."142 Thus, decriminalization of non-support 
was not dictated by the Maryland ERA.143 
C. State Action 
In 1978, a member of the Maryland House of Delegates asked 
the Maryland Attorney General whether, in his opinion, a private, 
non-profit, civic or charitable organization could discriminate on the 
basis of sex in Maryland. 144 In response, the Attorney General first 
noted that all federal prohibitions against sex-based discrimination 
do not apply to private discrimination because they require state 
action furthering the discrimination. Similarly, Maryland's due 
process provisions145 have been held to contain a state action 
requirement. 
The Maryland Attorney General went on to state that "the 
activities of private organizations hot affected with State action do 
not appear to be within the ambit of [the ERA)."146 That assessment, 
however, is not as clear as the Attorney General believed it to be. 
There are several aspects of the Attorney General's conclusion 
that warrant critical examination. 
1. The Express Language 
The thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution147 
was ratified in 1865 to abolish slavery forever in this country. Unlike 
139. Comment, Decriminalization of Non-support in Maryland - A Re-examination 
of a Uniform Act Whose Time Has Arrived, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 97 (1977). 
140. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 135 (1973). 
141. Law of May 29, 1978, ch. 921, 1978 Md. Laws 2703 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 88(a) (Supp. 1979)). 
142. [d. 
143. In Berry v. State, 41 Md. App. 563, 398 A.2d 59 (1979), one of the issues raised 
on appeal was whether the criminal provision for non-support of a minor child 
was unconstitutional under the ERA. In Coleman, the court of special appeals 
noted that although the criminal non-support statute was invalid as it applied 
to a husband who failed to support his wife, its decision "in no way affects the 
constitutionality of art. 27, § 88(b), which imposes criminal sanctions upon 'any 
parent' who deserts or willfully neglects to provide for the support of his or her 
minor child." 37 Md. App. at 323 n.1, 377 A.2d at 554 n.1. In Berry. the court 
did not decide the ERA issue because it had not been raised below. 
144. 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 246 (1978). 
145. Maryland's due process provisions are found scattered throughout the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights. MI>. CONST., D~:cL. (w Ruarrs arts. 19, 23, 24, 32. 
146. 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 246, 250 (1978l. 
147. U.S. CONRT. amend. XIII. 
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the fourteenth amendment, the prohibition against slavery contained 
no express language making it applicable solely against the states. 
On its face, the thirteenth amendment applied against everyone 
within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,148 the Supreme Court ruled 
that the thirteenth amendment prohibition against subjecting 
another person to slavery or involuntary servitude was directed at 
individual citizens as well as to the states. 149 The absence of any 
language in the thirteenth amendment requiring state action to 
prove a violation made it clear that Congress had not intended to 
require state action. 
The Maryland ERA provides, "Equality of rights under the law 
shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."150 The Maryland 
General Assembly did not include any language that might limit the 
application of the Maryland ERA to cases involving state action. The 
same rules that governed the Supreme Court in interpreting the 
thirteenth amendment should apply equally to the Maryland ERA. 
When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, words 
that would make that statute express another meaning may not be 
inferred.15I There is no need to look elsewhere to determine the intent 
of the legislature. 
The language of the Maryland ERA is clear and unambiguous; it 
mandates no state action. Following the example set by the Supreme 
Court in interpreting the thirteenth amendment and applying basic 
rules of statutory construction, the Maryland ERA seems clearly to 
require no state action. In Maryland, the ERA should apply to all 
persons, public and private. 
2. Other Equal Rights Amendments 
The proposed federal ERA provides, "Equality of rights under 
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State' on account of sex."152 During and prior to 1972, ten states 
adopted some form of constitutional equal protection for women. 
Four of those ten state equal rights amendments included some state 
action requirement within the language of the provision,l53 while the 
other six omitted any mention of state action. 154 
148. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
149. [d. at 20. See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
150. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46. 
151. See, e.g., Police Comm'r of BaIt. City v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 379 A.2d 1007 
(1977); Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 341 A.2d 789 (1975). 
152. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Congress, 2d Sess. (1972) (emphasis added>. For some 
inexplicable reason, the Maryland ERA contains the words 'denied' and 
'abridged' in reverse order of the proposed federal ERA. 
153. COLO. CONST. art. 2, ~ 29; ILL. CONST. art. 1, * 18; VA. CONST. art. 1, * 11; WYo. 
CONST. art. 1, * 3. 
154. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, ~ 3; HAWAII CONST. art. 1, * 21; PA. CONST. art. 1, * 28; TEX. 
CONST. art. 1, ~ 3a; UTAH CONST. art. 4, * 1; WASH. CONST. art. 31, * 1. 
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The Maryland General Assembly could have followed the lead of 
the United States Congress and those four state legislatures which 
had included express state action language. Instead, the Maryland 
legislature elected to exclude any state action language. Presumably, 
the members of the Maryland General Assembly were aware of the 
choices available and made a knowing decision to omit state action 
language. 
The effect of excluding state action language from state equal 
rights amendments has not yet been fully developed. Although some 
commentators have assumed that the enforcement of all state equal 
rights amendments requires state action,155 the better reasoned view 
is that no state action is required when none is mentioned. 
In Ebitz v. Pioneer National Bank/56 the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts considered the validity of a private trust that 
limited the beneficiaries of a scholarship fund to "young men." The 
court ruled that the testator's general testamentary scheme indi-
cated a desire to include women as beneficiaries of the trust fund. 
The court said in dicta, however, that if it had not so ruled, "the 
declared policy of the Commonwealth [under the ERA] regarding 
equal treatment of the sexes"157 would have led the court to require 
that women be included for aid through the scholarship fund. 
Future decisions regarding private discrimination under state 
equal rights amendments that contain no state action language will 
probably be in line with the dicta in Ebitz. The opinion of the 
Maryland Attorney General that the Maryland ERA requires state 
action is not altogether persuasive. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has indicated that it is not bound by an opinion Of the 
Attorney General and will not use an opinion that the court believes 
is not logically sound. ISS Thus, Maryland attorneys should beware of 
the Maryland Attorney General's opinion as to the state action 
requirement under the Maryland ERA. 
155. E.g., Comment, An Overview of the Equal Rights Amendment in Texas, 11 
Hous. L. REV. 136 (1973). 
156. 372 Mass. 207, 361 N.E.2d 225 (1977). 
157. [d. at 211, 361 N.E.2d at 227. 
158. Schmidt v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 285 Md. 148, 158, 400 A.2d 1124, 1129 (1979). 
[d. 
Beneficial argues that the Attorney General's opinion is a contempor-
aneous construction of the [law] which should not be disregarded except 
on the most imperative ground. The imperative ground here is that we 
do not agree with the conclusion reached by the Attorney General. We 
are not bound by an opinion of the Attorney General, and we do not find 
his opinion here to be persuasive. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Instead of a gradual progression toward equality of the sexes, 
the Maryland ERA caused a sharp break with earlier unsuccessful 
efforts to end sex discrimination. With the failure of the drive to 
ratify the federal ERA, the state ERA stands as the most comprehen-
sive protection from sex discrimination in Maryland. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland interpretation of the state ERA as an absolute 
bar to gender-based discrimination affords ultimate protection from 
discrimination. Rather than serving as an enforcement of rights 
already essentially guaranteed under the state constitution, the 
Maryland ERA has become a prime mover in the area of equal 
rights. 
The scope of the Maryland ERA is virtually unlimited. It affords 
protection from sex-based discrimination not available through the 
federal constitution, and unequaled in all but three states. Further, 
it appears that the Maryland ERA is not bound by a requirement of 
state action in assuring equal rights in Maryland. The Maryland 
ERA does indeed assure that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall 
not be abridged or denied because of sex." 
Peter S. Saucier 
